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No History or Society to be Found:
Object-Oriented Ontology and Social Ontology
Bennett Gilbert
It is widely theorized that the advent of the “Anthropocene Age” (under
this or any other name) is bringing one form of human temporality to
an end while it initiates another (Simon 2021). Because human activity
threatens the duration and well-being of the planetary biosphere, the
new age that this activity is bringing on—though it is proving to be extremely difficult to define—does present specific onto-epistemological
and moral challenges behind its political and social problems. The most
prominent and perhaps the core of these challenges is the demand to
shed anthropocentrism in human culture, a change that would deeply
alter our personal and social ethics through ontology and temporality.
The campaign for dis-anthropocentrization thus calls for a moral, scientific, social, and political challenge based on a change in ontology
that affects our conceptions of knowledge, reality, and the relations of
humankind to nature and of human beings to one another. I use the
term rigid or thoroughgoing dis-anthropocentrization for the purest
form of rigorous anti-anthropocentrism based philosophical analysis
of the fundamental ontology of history and society.
The ontology that has been most used in developing the connection
between anthropocentrism and the Anthropocene Age is speculative
realism. In this paper I will show that speculative realism uses an
ontology that cannot explain human social and historical relations
and that therefore must fail to account for any new configuration of
social temporality. This failure becomes evident when we examine the
philosophy of history that speculative realism has no other resource
than to adopt when it looks at human relations. And yet a viable sense
of history and temporality is necessary for improving the balance
between humankind and nature (Thomas 2014). I make a few basic
suggestions for better ways of doing this at the end of this paper.
Speculative realisms, having broadly rejected reductionisms, hold
instead that the universe comprises forces, processes, and objects,
strictly physical and not mind-dependent, that we had failed to comprehend through reductionist materialist ontologies until recent science
gave us the knowledge with which to do so. Under this view, the anthropocentric perspective is both false in its claims and perilous in its
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consequences. The real being of the universe, as speculative realisms
take it to be, is not circumscribed by the contents of human intentional consciousness but rather is all its objects and events, with all
resulting physical and emergent properties and their weird causalities.
The human career is determinatively subject to these processes, and
explaining them on their own terms is the true account of reality that is
ontologically fundamental. They claim that full realism of the correct
sort, although its proponents generally reject the correspondence theory of truth, will produce forms of culture that are empirically accurate
in a way they cannot be under anthropocentrism.
For the speculative realist claim is not just that nature is out of our
control or “disenchanted” or that our role in the cosmos is small. Rather,
it is also the claim that these facts, which must drive us to recognize
that renouncing a veridical view of things solely from our perspective,
as proponents say modern science requires will have greater consequences than commonly recognized hitherto, especially in Western
thought. We may generalize these consequences by the term “flat ontology.” Sometimes this term broadly, perhaps blandly, signals merely
a lay rejection of anthropocentrism. But its origin is as a strong and
specific doctrine of fundamental philosophy developed in the 1990s by
the creators of object-oriented ontology, which is a doctrinal form of
speculative realism. 1 Flat ontology means that reality is truly and thoroughly not mind-dependent, neither governed by ideas nor directed
by conceptual forces or conscious intention nor subject to any divinity
specifically committed to human well-being (Harman 2016: 28–29).
It means, furthermore, that each and every existent has exactly the
same kind, and level, and quality of being, and has equally a history. It
intends to draw out the consequences of the fact that the real universe
includes all the things of which we cannot have knowledge with an
active reality equal to that of the domain of the intelligible
Its first theorist, Graham Harman, says that flat ontology is only
“a good starting-point” to improving realism (Harman 2016a: 54). This
is true in so far as it is the beginning of the system-building: it is a
platform from which one can develop consequences in various direc1. Quick summaries of its leading ideas will be found in Harman, Object-Oriented
Ontology: : a New Theory of Everything (London: Pelican 2018): 8–9; and in Stephen
Umbrello’s review of this book in Cultural Studies Review, vol. 24, no. 2 (2018): 184–186.
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tions. But flat ontology rests on a particular argument, which empowers its broad use in ambitious speculative realist theorization. In
order to support other systematic thinking, it must necessarily rely
on an underlying argument that structures or extends through its
conceptual development. Flat ontology includes an exhortation to disanthropcentrization, but we must look at the logic behind it unless it
is to be merely a signal-flare of polemical approval or disapproval.
The general thrust of speculative realism as a whole is, as I have said,
to develop a realist ontology so thoroughly purged of mind-dependence
and intentional consciousness that every one of the limitations that
human cognition imposes, or seems to impose, on grasping the possibilities of the real existence of entities, and the activities thereof, is
regarded as distorting the real. We experience and express only a tiny
part of universal reality (Harman 2016a: 6–7, 26). In particular, our
intelligence is so utterly finite that even our conception of finitude is
a merely human addition to reality itself. The way to “speculation”
is thus opened within realism by arguing that our limitations cannot
validate empirical knowledge, including our best understandings of
causality, matter, force, or change, for example, as truths. So much the
less ought we to tolerate any sort of reductionism, Harman and others
argue, since we are parts of a pluriverse with no privileged access
to or knowledge of any other parts (Bryant and Srnicek et al. 2011).
This leads to the intense dis-anthropocentrizing work of all forms
of speculative realisms, even those that tend toward panpsychism or
toward vitalism. Speculative realism seeks to be a balance-point calibrated to yield a seemingly warm and poetic non-idealist ontology
that maintains due regard for empiricism as tempered by its famous
flat ontology.
In pursuit of complete rejection of anthropocentrism, object-oriented
ontology dismisses all mind-dependence, whether in knowledge or in
being. It is concerned with explaining real being rather than explaining
our knowledge of reality. Mind-dependence, and therefore the centrality of ideas in the sense of the artifacts of human mental conception, is
the part of idealism that drives object-oriented ontology by reaction
into realism. Since matter is a human conception applied to many
existent objects, it is to be rejected. This is the basis of what Haman
calls immaterialism (that is, an immaterialist realism) in object-oriented
3

Bennett Gilbert

ontology. 2 Whereas George Berkeley, holding that the notion of matter
necessarily leads to both scepticism and to existential nihilism, denied
matter in order to establish sure relations among conscious beings,
well-founded human knowledge, and the certainty of our existence
upon it, object-oriented ontology denies matter in order to demolish
such firm conclusions, at least as they are conventionally understood.
This ontology proceeds to replacing forces, things, and events as we
customarily understand them—the whole temporal and historical shape
of reality, in fact, as available to the human point of view—with “objects” defined as including much more than bounded three-dimensional
things (Harman 2018: 38ff., 52–54). “Objects” are things and processes,
together, innumerable and always coming-into-existence and passingaway, sometimes instantaneously and sometimes over great spans of
time—both the extremely short and the extremely long being deeply
different from temporality as anthropocentrically apprehended.
Because object-oriented ontology holds that humans are not ontologically different from any other “object,” it also holds that our
knowledge does not connect us to what is in fact the incomprehensible and irreducibly vast majority of being—all of that which, lying
in imperceptible time and space beyond the sensuous, must remain
hidden from us. Thus, true reality—true by its vast majority vote, as
it were, as against our infinitesimally small caucus—is “withdrawn”
(Harman 2015). Neither by reduction into elements or indivisibles
nor by abstraction into universals can we humans know the reality of
“objects” (Harman 2016a: 7–13; Harman 2018: 41–52). This is true for
all non-human entities as well. Smart and conscious as we seem to be
or wholly dumb and inert as many things in the universe seem to us
to be, we cannot know their reality in all the richness it might contain.
Neither they nor we can truly directly relate its or our understanding
to the reality of another “object.” The reality of one “object” is always
surplus to the reality of it to the others and is never knowable by them.
Under this view, the “real” nature of the world is not truthfully understood when we account for it from the “human” perspective, which
it takes as constrained by anthropocentric desires and fears and their
2. In my view, what Harman calls his immaterialism is probably better named
non-materialism in order to distinguish it from Berkeleian immaterialism; and I will
occasionally use this term below.
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expression as metaphysics. We see that here object-oriented ontology
takes a path quite far from that taken by vitalist or panpsychic-inflected
speculative realisms because it centralizes separation rather than commonality, connection, or interdependence. For it, the notions of life
and soul cannot take human understanding into the reality of the rest
of the universe any more than matter can. If we are natural rather than
humanly non-natural and therefore not special, then we are part of a
universe in which consciousness and knowledge are other than what
they seem to be from the anthropocentric perspective. In fact, they
must be opposite.
The concept that requires opposition and that this picture, which
drives all thoroughgoing rejection of anthropecentrism in understanding human temporality, history, and society, requires is antitupia—the
resistance of an entity to impacts from other entities or forces. 3 Leibniz
used it as the scaffolding of the architectonic of monads, which coordinates their histories without their having to penetrate one another;
but here it necessitates the “withdrawnness” of all objects from all
penetration, compression, or alteration, whether physical or not. 4 For
Leibniz, every entity has a point of view upon all other entities by
which God co-ordinates all things. For Harman, every “object” has
a view of itself by which it resists all other “objects.” Existence as it
really is, is resistance.

3. The earliest reference to this concept by the name antitupia (ἀντιτυπία) that
I have found is a statement attributed to the atomist Democritus by Aëtius (Placita
1.26.2) that antitupia, locomotion, and the collision of matter together constitute (what
the editors interpolate as) necessity. See André Laks and Glen Most, et al., eds., Early
Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), vol. 7, pt. 2, p. 139
(Later Ionian and Athenian Thinkers), chapter 22 (Atomists), D75 (= Diels-Kranz, Die
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 68 A66). Although in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae the
word appears only in Christian writers of the fifth century CE and after, with the
one exception of a text by Aelian c. 200 CE—roughly contemporary with Aëtius—the
scholarship takes Aelius’ text as a quote from Democritus; thus it is a “D” fragment in
Laks and Most and an “A” fragment in Diels-Kranz
4. In Specimen Dynamicum (1695) Leibniz establishes antitupia as the resistance
of bodies that became the impossibility of a monad’s having any physical influence
upon “the inner being of another” in the “Monadologia” (1714), in Monadology and
Other Philosophical Writings, trans. Robert Latta (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1925), sec. 51. “Antitypy” was used by Henry More, Boyle, and Locke; and although
out of use now I have adopted it here as the most precise term available.
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Object-oriented ontology requires antitypy in order to conceive
that resistance of “objects” not only to us but also to one another on
which its principal notions of withdrawnness is based (Harman 2018:
66–88, 189–191). Withdrawal may well be endogenous and without
concern for, or connection to, true knowledge of that from which an
“object” withdraws; but its premise is the native capacity to maintain ontological and epistemological resistance. From resistance follows withdrawal, and ontological flatness requires this grip that every “object”
exercises upon its being. The argument of object-oriented ontology is
that if you require flatness you must require the hard disconnection of
antitypy.
Now, antitypy is a lesson we all learn in childhood. As you crawl
out of the crib and bump into the chest of drawers, you push and test
it a while to find that, unlike the little ball on the floor, it will not move.
Your decision to crawl around it germinates many decisions in your
life to act so as to move around objects that you can’t move or that
won’t move themselves or at times to move away from objects that
endanger you. Knowledge of antitypy is meaningful and consequential
on many levels because we use it as a basic affirmative fact.
The logic of object-oriented ontology totalizes the notion of antitypy so that it structures all reality, both known and unknowable,
and in particular all time and all diachronesis—all history—and all
relationships—all sociality. The logic of this totalized ontology leads to
startling results. The more fully real an object is, the more it is antitypical. The flourishing of its antitypy is its flourishing; but also objecthood
itself is sufficiently and necessarily a state of having antitypy, whether
the resistance to relations is in good repair, being well withdrawn, or
in poor repair, due to over-exposure. When an “object’s” power of antitypy weakens, the “object” passes away. Thus, because withdrawnness
is necessary to objecthood, and because we cannot know most of reality due to its withdrawnness, this ontology fundamentalizes antitypy
in both our knowledge and in being. Antitypy itself is little more than
the logic of self-identity: an object is what it is and is not other than
itself. But object-oriented ontology is the logic of self-identity totalized
over all quantity, quality, relations, and modes—over all properties and
processes. When all understanding is required to submit to the logic
of self-identity, all other structure is deflated and can ultimately be
invalidated or negated. The finale of this is ontology weaponized like
6
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a battle-star against any diachronic possibility of a non-self-identical
state of persistent being. It will therefore not be surprising to find that
pursuing anti-anthropocentrism in this way leaves us with no viable
account of social relations and of the temporalities in which they take
place.
The proponent of object-oriented ontology is surely puzzled by
these conclusions, for her project is to justify thoroughgoingly nonreductive ontological pluralism. But what justifies her pluralism here
is the inner character she ascribes to the plural entities, which is antitypical self-identity and which will subvert pluralism. I do not claim
that object-oriented ontology has fallen into reductionism, in so far
as no substance or process or specific class of entities is regarded as
ontologically prior to all other being. Nor is the totalized antitypy a
sort of universalization or abstraction that crushes the pluriverse. It
does crush the pluriverse, but by a means subtly different from both
reduction and abstraction. For the instrument that the logical operation
of absolutizing self-identity that I have described uses to reject relational, intentional, and perspectival views of reality is in fact moral, as
it has severe moral consequences; and this moral instrument requires
theories of sociality and of history. As logic, antitypy can be reductive
or abstractive or some of both, despite the desires of the object-oriented
ontologist. What really counts here, what truly is at work, is the overthrow of the accumulating power of the history of our common social
and moral life and of the history of thinking and conception in favor of
the power of value-free logic—even though our proponent rejects such
objectivity as viciously anthropocentric—sharpened as the subjection
of ethics to ontology.
Because object-oriented ontology re-natures the manifold of human life with its ontology, it must generate a theory of human behavior
congruent to the ontology. The theory it comes up with shows us why
these anti-constructivist speculative realisms must support a thoroughgoing dis-anthropocentrizing if they are to be consistent and why such
a doctrine will not survive analysis. We will see, just as we already
know, that it is dynamics and dialectics, change and challenge, and
desire and loss, each of these at a different level of understanding, that
disrupt the smooth smothering of thought by logic.
The best, if not the sole, theory of historical change and, more
broadly, of sociality in general available to object-oriented ontology is
7
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Graham Harman’s historiographic theory of symbioses. 5 By looking
at his historiography we can see how and why antitypy in objectoriented ontology poses a severe problem for speculative materialisms
as well as speculative realisms, even though object-oriented ontology
is a non-materialist realism, through a problem in its social ontology.
I am aware of just two efforts by speculative realists besides Graham Harman’s to address historical change. The first is by the objectoriented ontologist Levi Bryant. In my view its bases are the same as
those of Harman’s theory, and it employs much the same conceptual
mechanics (Bryant 2014: 157–174). The other is by Tristan Garcia,
a friend of object-oriented ontology but rather in a class by himself
(Garcia 2014). His theory centers on the metaphysics, particularly the
analytic metaphysics, of time. Investigating time can be fruitful for the
social philosophy of history, but it is a foggy and mucky job, which
Garcia has not taken on as extensively as it requires. More basically,
we want the particular dense plurality and rich instability of historical
change to guide us in chief in thinking about change in human society,
rather than taking our start from the very difficult and tautology-ridden
field of the philosophy of time. In his actor-network theory Bruno
Latour has taken on sociality quite more fully than object-oriented
ontology has, with better moral and political implications; but these
are also the points at which Harman separates object-oriented ontology from actor-network theory (Harman 2016b). So far as I know,
Harman’s theory of symbioses has not been examined in the context
of philosophy of history nor as social or interpersonal theory. 6
It is from the strapped-in totalized self-identity that Graham Harman squeezes out object-oriented ontology’s understanding of change.
But theories of historical change require, nearly by definition, closely
intertwined connections among actions and events in some kind of
temporal dimension. They follow the relations among human beings
5. Harman 2018: 114–134, uses the Civil War, which is a personal passion of
his as it is for so many, as an historiographic topic; but his onto-historical and ontosocial theory is more extensively developed, using the history of the Dutch East India
Company, in his Immaterialism, especially 1–34 and 107–126.
6. Most of the published comments on it are to be found deep in often admiring
expositions of Harman’s notions. These take his historical theory as a fresh and
striking example of the power of his ideas and wholly lack reference to the entire
literature of social ontology or historical theory.
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and between them and the natural world. Sometimes chronological
succession dominates the perspective, as in the innumerable versions
of progressivism laid into the cornerstone of modern historiography by
Hegel and others, and in their opposite—theories of decline, whether
from the era of de Volney and Gibbon or from the era of Spengler
and Toynbee. At other times, part-to-whole relationships dominate,
as in the “covering laws” theory of Carl Hempel—ruthlessly kicked
about in a long intramural polemic—or in chronosophies built around
redemption, both Augustinian and Benjaminian. Historical change can
be taken to have the directionality of narrative, such as the ironic or
the tragic plot-line (White 1973). Still other philosophies of history or
of social change understand historical change through the histories of
emotions or of technology, and through such metaphors of the generation of difference in language, or in socio-economic phenomena
themselves, or in ideas. Some recent theory understands historical
change, even when it appears gentle, as radical chasms over which
entities leap into fundamental alterations (Simon 2019).
In place of such schemata and causes, Harman’s doctrinal development of this ontology leads its approach to change into the realm of
sociality where something is required if his ontology is not to gutter
out by failing to face history. He supplies this as a theory of historical
change and of sociality, developed through substantial heavily theorized research inquiries into two historical events. Note that the theory
uses an unquestioned concept of additive and progressive time—yet
another problem for it that I will not address here.
In object-oriented ontology, the continual formation of speculative
“objects,” each more than the sum of its parts and never exhausted
by the other “objects” around it or fully penetrated by human or any
other cognition, is the quasi-noumenal, or quasi-essential, activity in
the withdrawn real reality of objects (Harman 2018: 149–161). Based
on the claim that most of the real reality of everything that exists is
typically withdrawn from us, Harman names what our insufficient
access to it through the sensuous reveals to us, or at least to him,
by the word “symbiosis,” or bunches of symbioses. This is a way to
describe historical change in the true objecthood of events under this
theory, without using any familiar or conventional sorts of relationality.
Harman argues that real knowledge of historical “objects” concerns
what they turn away from: their “proximate failures” and the symbioses
9
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that consolidate their monadic autonomy because “the death of an
objects comes from the excessive strength of its ties” (Harman 2016:
116–119, 124). In the two historical accounts that he has published,
Harman uses the symbioses he details as drivers of the coming-intobeing and the passing-away of the topics he researched. Under such
a theory, these symbioses strengthen an “object” as itself, in its inner
and non-relational objecthood; it can thereafter become most fully and
really itself when its reality is most withdrawn from other “objects”;
and finally those symbioses invade and de-nature it, miscegenating it
with some alien “objects,” until it melts away across imperceptible and
infinitesimal subtractions.
Recall that reality in flat ontology is wholly non-intentional. This
is why things and processes, together called “objects,” are separated
from interconnection and constituted as withdrawn. As a result, even
if Harman’s historiographic accounts are merely a way to explore the
theory, he describes an American Civil War in which death and fear
and hope and moral vision play no evident part. The same is true of
his account of the Dutch East India Company (known by its Dutch
initials as the V.O.C.), from which greed, cruelty, and curiosity are
absent. Intention and emotion are not the only factors to be deflated in
consequentiality. We find nothing of the “reciprocal recognition” and
“remembered rationality,” in Robert Brandom’s words, that structure
Hegel’s and most subsequent accounts of human historical change
(Brandom 2021). Indeed, the theory makes no account of the role of
interpretation of memories, texts, and other historical evidence by
actors and by historians. Harman’s ontology also limits the truthvalue of realist science and physical causality, for which symbiosis is
the substitution. But Harman (and Bryant as well) does turn to the
physical forces that empirical inquiry discovers, endeavoring to find a
way through object-oriented ontology to give a different account of
historical operations. 7 If, then, historical explanation by symbioses or
by machinic activity employs neither intentionality nor causality, these
theories propose “symbioses” as a whole other approach to historical
change.
7. Bryant’s history also is passionless: for example, in Democracy of Objects, (London: Open Humanities Press, 2011), 201–203, “objective” factors are more historical
causes than verbal thinking, which he says is not adequate to the brutality of events.
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To use the physical world but without relationality, Harman has his
symbioses comprise sequences that are neither bio-organic, nor causal,
nor biographical, nor logically entailed, nor mereological. They are,
instead, the “events” in the self-organizing agency of “objects,” which,
as I have mentioned, includes institutions, forces, and processes, as
well as bodies. The study of them is not foundationally historiographic,
or political, or sociological, or a matter of the physical or life sciences.
Instead, the knowledge that application of this theory is supposed to
provide is supposed holistic at the extreme though also simultaneously
within the thoroughgoingly “other” level for which object-oriented
ontology claims to account. There is the “objectively” real, but the
really real is very much vaster and is “really” knowable only outside
of our sensuous cognition or intellection (at least, as understood by
both idealism and traditional realism and materialism) and only in the
dimmest way at that (Harman 2018: 82–85, 180–181, 189–191). The
result is that Harman sheds the entire range of human temporalities.
Harman’s aim is to enter the gates of reality by ducking in between
the two hounds guarding them, one howling materialist reduction and
the other howling idealism. Although the sentiment is by no means
unprecedented, his middle way is indeed neither of these but a third
thing, spurred into place by his discontent with the
...“human-world duopoly,” a dual monarchy of human and world, a
“Habsburg metaphysics” forever incapable of considering humans
as “just one kind of entity among trillions of others,” and equally
incapable of considering what things do when there’s no humans
around. (Peters 2015: 167–168)

This approach can also allow reality for “objects out there that
are simply never activated...,” including historical counterfactuals (Peters 2015: 198–199). The theory of symbioses is configured so as to
fit into this precise spot, where the new realist philosopher explains
historical change without objectively real interactions, social or subjective constructions, or the centralization of human perception and
intentionality. As to whether a description of a symbiosis or bunch
of symbioses objectively refers us to reality or is a mediated representation of reality, it seems that object-oriented ontology wants to
maintain the availability of part of reality to empirical verifiability,
denying any constructivist critique of representation, and at the same
11
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time to emphasize the unavailability of most of reality to any mode of
human understanding.
Harman must dis-anthropocentricize history and the social world
because his ontology dis-anthropocentrizes change in its fundamental
concept of being. The part of reality that is overlooked because it is
outside the human subject’s center and is unintelligible to us, the part
Harman aims to account for by symbioses, is change, including all
the events of natural history and all the acts of human history. He
holds that under any other ontology change and therefore history are
inexplicable; to explain it we have to put its mysteriousness at the
center of our account.
Whereas for me the object is that which is robust to such changes
in both directions; the object is that which maintains an identity to
some extent. (Peters 2015: 178)

But change is inexplicable precisely (and perhaps only) when one
defends antitypy. Antitypy is fundamentally anti-temporal; that is, it
is a matter of propositions rather than of any dynamic and concrete
reality. Finding that change punctures antitypy, Harman converts antitypy into mystery, the unknown, the endless, into everything that is
outside of the human perspective. To explain change, he combines resistance to changes that don’t occur (counterfactuals) with affordances
of changes that do occur into the antitypy of objects; and then history
can be re-written on this account of change. But under this ontology,
the changeability of an object, which we call its historical relationships,
resides, so to speak, in its own identity, which fully exists only in so
far as it is immutable, for even potentiality could not explain change
because it resides within human comprehension and therefore outside the real and full identity of objects. Because the anthropocentric
social-historical perspective breaks antitypy, object-oriented ontology
elevates antitypy above any other feature of reality (Peters 2015: 191).
Such is the motivation to explain change without limiting it to any
paradigm of human observation that governs the theory of symbioses.
But antitypy does not resolve the complex puzzles of change and
of our perceptions of change merely by standing outside of the human
subject. Harman says that “objects,” being in reality withdrawn, have
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no relations (Peters 2015: 171). 8 Here a “relation” is the impress or
effect of one thing on another in the absence of antitypy. But Harman’s symbioses actually are relations among real objects just because
coming-into-being and the passing-away of real objects are related to or
impacted by the histories of other real objects. So the theory maintains
some definition of relations, or connections, as explanatory, historical
truths while dismissing relationality. It announces non-relationality on
its marquee while the show inside the hall is actually an account of relations. 9 This onto-historiographic show—historical change understood
as symbioses—either describes change by using what we ordinarily and
comprehensively understand as relationships or it has no content at
all and therefore explains nothing. The theory of symbioses is a device
for jumbling both realistic factuality and an extreme, rigid, and also
quasi-poetic, mysteriousness of the world in our understanding. It describes a kind of relation in real being that it holds to be non-relational.
Failing adoption of a notion of divinity or of practices to attain empty
consciousness, object-oriented ontology cannot position any understanding outside of our perspective, except by inventing a name. And
this name, symbiosis, is a strongly inapt term for object-oriented ontology since in its etymology it designates the full interdependence of
two or more living beings.
Harman’s historical theory is a very focused attempt to fill out
the view of sociality that speculative realisms generate. As Maurizio
Ferraris puts it,
Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that social objects, which
depend on subjects (though they are not subjective), are also things
in themselves and not phenomena. This may seem complicated at
first because, if social objects depend on conceptual schemes, then it
should obviously follow that they are phenomena. But it is not so. In
order to be a phenomenon, it is not enough to depend on conceptual
schemes. A phenomenon must also be in contrast with things in
themselves. (Ferraris 2015: 158)
8. Cf. Harman 2002: 223–224 for varying expressions as o whether and how
much an object “translates” another object that affects it into itself.
9. Harman confines the influence of objects on one another to their “sensuous”
reality, in which “indirect relations” obtain (Harman 2018: 149–193). But the entire
elaborately expounded theory of “indirect relations” serves only to patch or to hide
the problem to which absolutized antitypy leads.
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We see here that social relations are framed as objects and that
they are puzzling to the speculative realist. Of course, they have been
ontological oddities for a great many important thinkers since at least
the nineteenth century, and there are today numerous theories about
the relations that we experience in sociality.
Harman’s specification of rigid dis-anthropecentrism by his historiographic theory of symbioses should be generously viewed, along with
the work of other speculative realists, as parts of an effort common to
all good philosophers to appreciate how much we do not know and as
part of the anti-scientistic effort to show that there are many kinds of
knowledge. There might even be a need for counterfactuals as entities
in these wider endeavors. And certainly there is very good reason for
the liberty of both theory and practice to explore the counter-intuitive,
the imaginary, and the seemingly impossible. The theory of symbioses,
however, does show a flaw in object-oriented ontology and in all speculative realisms to varying degrees because it tests philosophy upon
historiography and fails that test. Despite the agonism between narrativity and positivity, historical accounts of human society, as well as
any knowing, writing, and just thinking about human events all rely,
no matter upon what theory conducted, on facts that, though always
qualified in some respect and never objective in every respect, are of
all the synchronic and diachronic sorts that phenomenally present
themselves. The eliminative logic of antitypical self-identity leads naturally to a passionless suppression of the social and the moral as well
as vitiating the power of facts. These two things are precisely what
any philosophical account of the temporality of society should not do.
Object-oriented ontology generates, as its principles entailed it
to do, the historical theory I just described and criticized. While this
ontology is “immaterialist,” its historical theory shows how all speculative realisms must require rigid dis-anthropocentrism in order to give
a consistently realistic account of the universe. As a result, speculative
realisms fail to account for what we know about human actions and
behaviors and therefore fall short of what we need theory, especially as
philosophical anthropology and as morally-grounded understanding
of human life, to do for us. There can be quite a few reasons to dismiss
hard realisms in favor of neo-idealism and versions of constructivism—
for example, the fact that quantum reality does not have the emergent
features of phenomenal reality or that the persuasive power of ideas
14
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can change behavior throughout a society—but here the matter of concern is what do we do with neo-realist and neo-materialist forms of
the prescription to dis-anthropocentrize.
Object-oriented ontology does in fact accurately pursue the disanthropocentrizing impulse of the logic of the speculative realisms to
its completion: if the nature of reality is fully not mind-dependent and
thereby is not governed or structured in any way by ideas, then our
conceptions of matter, including the most scientific materialism, are
detached from true being. At most they might describe some small bits
of reality by coincidence, so to speak; but neither none of them nor all
of them can possibly account for reality. And if all objects are ontologically equal, we are as adrift in understanding human behavior and
history as in understanding, say, dark matter or far stars. Flat ontology,
so cheerfully adopted by many writers, must yield non-materialism
of Harman’s sort (“immaterialism”) if it is to be consistent; and it also
cannot be defended without non-materialism. Since non-materialism
proves that what I have called the totalized logic of antitypical selfidentity is necessary for rigid dis-anthropocentrization, materialist
realisms must therefore accept this logic in order to forward a project
of rigid anti-anthropocentrism. But then they must cease to be materialist. If they rejects this logic, the new materialists among speculative
realists really just go back to the old materialism. 10 They can affirm
non-rigid non-anthropocentrism only by taking both horns: denying
the totalized logic of self-identity and ceasing to be materialism. Some
speculative realists, such as Jon Cogburn, do proceed in the direction of
dialethism (Cogburn 2017: 56–57). In allowing for hermeneutics, this
approach seems to admit some measure of constructivism and some
use of intention in understanding human activity. In searching for a
way around metastasized ratio, it is of little moment whether we call
this speculative non-materialist path neo-realist or neo-idealist. For
the moral point of view, this is de minimis.
Just as strong anthropocentrism requires totally subsuming human
experience under our conscious and intentional perspective, so total,
rigid, thorough-going anti-anthropocentrism necessarily relies on the
10. Timothy J. Lecain’s The Matter of History: How Things Create the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), a synoptic argument for “new materialism,”
ends up as the old materialism for just this reason.
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object-oriented ontological argument that the whole of all of our experience and resulting knowledge, even verifiable empirical knowledge,
are not merely limited, as anyone will agree, but are also founded
upon anthropocentric conceptions and therewith incompatible with a
thoroughgoing revolution in our understanding of the universe. Speculative materialist realisms seek to brighten, free, and renovate our
accounts of causality, agency, and events. But they can logically do
this whilst not returning to old and crudely reductive realisms if and
only if they base their approach on rejection of the notion of matter.
This disables their materialism.
Object-oriented ontology is right about this, and speculative realisms are stuck all the way down the line with this fact in considering
their congruence with speculative materialisms. If they propose a
profound alteration in epistemology, they are in need of this ontology—
unless they consent to finding a way to maintain the connections of
the human and the world while maintaining substantial distinctions
between the one and the other. What remains is the claim by analogy
that antitypy explains historical change without causality and human
relationships without temporality. A symbiosis is a connection though
not a “real relation.” If this connection is our ordinary experience of
antitypy, then it is a part of ordinary relationality. If symbiosis is not
antitypy, then the concept explains nothing, because neither symbiosis
nor the withdrawn can serve as the other term in the analogy from
antitypy, since they are not supposed to be anything like it. This is a
happy outcome for those of us concerned with the meaningfulness in
the human material, social, psychic, and spiritual world, which requires
reflection on and re-mediation of historical experience.
If the theory of symbioses fails to satisfy our desire to understand
temporality, social development, and the history of human affairs, so
also does any new materialism that relies on ordinary causality, which
must go the way of old-fashioned matter when the logic of self-identity
is imposed as an absolute in order to prove the otherness of all objects
(ours no less than that of other species), all kinds of things, and all
existents in the world. The failure of antitypy to explain history, sociality, and our imbrication with nature is the measure (and in another
sense the actual cause) of the impossibility, revealed by the historicaltheoretic perspective, of completely rejecting anthropocentrism on the
basis of a logic of ontology, which is driven by just those passions,
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needs, and a measure of narcissism that a sustainable relation with the
natural world must avoid.
If the epistemology of speculative realisms requires an ontology
with the vitiating reliance on antitypy, is there any way out of this
dead end by which speculative realisms can contribute to the common
project of advancing human understanding, especially in the crucial
domain of exploring temporality and human social and historical relationships? Their abandoning materialisms would help. Because it is
not possible to be materialist by halves, materialisms of any sort will either become non-materialist speculative realisms or deflate speculative
realism into materialism. In effect, there can be no neo-materialism
just on its own foundation. But this is only a guardrail against collapse
and gives us nothing new to affirm.
The speculative realist will be, I am confident, frustrated by the
mise en abîme I argued that antitypy presents it. They start by wanting
to argue for why change is possible and does happen, not for why it is
impossible to conceive. Why should a line of philosophy profoundly
committed to a pluralistic reality be tripped up just when humankind
approaches the possibility of the most magnified knowledge of the
universe it has ever glimpsed and also right when the life-or-death
problems of its survival in that universe are more fearfully difficult
than ever? No one benefits by choking off what now seems impossible
or unknowable. Speculative realism itself has not been the last word on
the matter from speculative realism, which even in the last two decades
grows in new directions. Speculative realism as a whole even presents
itself as not only a way to think that can advance us but as the ground
of the possibility of advancing thought beyond a certain historical stage
situated (roughly speaking) in Occidental epistemology and ontology
prior to and up through Heidegger. So if its understanding of change
as temporality and history, as philosophical anthropology, as cultural
theory, and as the accumulated existential situation of humankind at
this point must be the test for speculative realisms, as I hold, the case
for speculative realisms deserves further exploration. Is there a way to
enable it, to click it on, as social thought and as philosophy of history?
The case for a speculative realist understanding of change broader
than that which I presented above is well put by Maurizio Ferraris:

17

Bennett Gilbert
...reality does not only manifest itself as resistance and negativity:
every negation entails a determination and a possibility. The world
exerts an affordance through the objects and the environment, that
qualifies as a positive realism. Strong, independent and stubborn, the
world of objects that surround us (including the subjects we interact
with, which are another kind of objects) does not merely say no: it
does not only resist us, as if to say “here I am, I am here.” It is also the
greatest ontological positivity, because its very resistance, opacity
and refusal to come to terms with concepts and thought are what
assures us that the world of objects we deal with is not a dream it
is this very positivity that allows us to dwell in the world despite
the fact that our notions are rarely clear and distinct. (Ferraris 2015:
153–154; text emphasized [originally bolded] by Ferraris)

The word “affordance,” borrowed from anthropology, works too
hard here. It is intended to affirm that the critical claim of speculative
realism is about what does really happen rather than about a point
of logic. If it means that objects change even though they have no
relations with one another and never can affect one another, it is no
more than an atropaic to expel the threat of antitypy. One cannot
perform magic by a prosopoeia, through which objects say something
contradictory, enacting thereby a role that makes sense for humans but
not for the world not humanly understood. That the way to understand
this positivity seems to be to render it into most emotional terms about
human relationships undercuts speculative realism. If, on the other
hand, it is not an amulet and instead has meaning, it means that change
exists through the interaction of things and processes, then it describes
relations among them. There must be alteration due to relations among
objects over time and space, and thus an interdependent and social
history, or the only action of objects is to recede and to withdraw.
Speculative realism argues that reality must include a vast domain
not at all related to the human because we know that things existed long
before human observers and unsurpassably beyond our range of observation. This is a direct and obvious truth. Unaided, we cannot even see
the ultraviolet light or detect the electromagnetic fields that always
surrounds us. But it is also an equally direct and obvious truth that
we cannot observe or think from a position outside our consciousness
and, in particular, without extensive reliance on language—although
experience itself does not require language. The world suffuses us into
itself through the vastness of our verbal discourse, and the conceptions
18

No History or Society to be Found

belonging to discourse are the ineliminable and principal non-mystical
way we swirl ourselves into the rest of reality. Neither position is
a new thought. And so it seems that both realism and idealism will
have to live together. For their part speculative realisms, whenever
they insist on ontology founded on antitypy, face either surrender
to reductive materialisms or accept human interpersonal normative
self-constitution
The speculative realist counter-argument, as explained here, is that
speculative realism conceives of change in terms of affordances (and
constraints) because these describe world-processes not dependent on
the anthropocentric perspective. But this does not deflate the central
impact of the concept of antitypical self-identity I have highlighted in
the speculative realist account of change. It leads either to materialism
limited by human conception or to linguistic or social or another form
of constructivism—all roundly rejected by Harman and speculative
realism as a whole. To the question whether speculative realism can
de-center the human?, the answer, then, is no, it cannot. It must accept
cohabitation with idealism of some form. But by seeing this we can
see more constructive possibilities.
The way out for theorizing a new social ontology of temporality is not to insist on antitypy. Without antitypy the possibilities of
new paths for thinking about social ontology, including the problem
of anthropocentrism, in both new realist and neo-idealist ways and
in combinations of these impulses, is wide. Indeed, it might just be
that the binary thinking manifested in antitypy and in many parts of
logic and metaphysics is the one of the causes of the weakening of
traditional ontology. Another way to put this is: new realisms (and
neo-idealism as well) must abandon ontology in this mode as well as
in the “traditional” mode if it is to de-center the human because rigid
and through dis-anthropocentrization requires a concept (antitypy)
that makes accounting for change impossible and therefore makes the
project impossible. A good philosophical anthropology needs some
account of change in nature and in the human in community with one
another.
Under this view, there are two requirements from our existential
experience of all that is both near to us and withdrawn from us that
suggest ways can de-center the human through a balanced ontological
view of historical and social processes. First, we must describe the
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interdependence of existents, that is, it must account for a relational
and social universe, the universe as a community. Second, we must
provide for the moral weight of persons, things, actions, and events.
A modest anthropocentrism that, requiring a different ontology,
enriches connections and moral force actualizes our personal, collective, multi-structural, intra-species, polychronic, and existential moral
address to all the existence in the world in a community made as universal as ever we possibly can over the course of time. The ground of
this possibility is the fulminating effect on the existential situation that
both materialist and non-materialist speculative realisms are guilty of
undervaluing: our mortality, out of which the dead we have been and
the dead we will become give responsibility to us the living through an
ontology that can envision the moral effects of historical temporalities.
Our sociality with the past and the future is based upon this; totalizing
logic cannot take it in. Of it, immaterialist ontology makes bloodless
social reflection and historiography, displacing the impact of life, joy,
death and loss on us into a void. Materialist historiography, having a
simpler and less distracting ontology, either elides its own naturalism in
order to express the principles of justice its proponents hold or drowns
it under the endless contingency of the material universe. Human
consciousness, though it often rots upon its vanity, nonetheless has
the sole possibility we know of, and certainly all the responsibility we
can bear, for passionately addressing loss and suffering for improving
our rucktious history.
We need not totalize. Though most people feel that they are connected to other lives and to non-human existence and so would naturally choose the path of relationality, one might nevertheless feel,
under the force of speculative realism, that feelings betray truth and
are inadequate to the asperous necessity of the way of disconnection.
We can look at the path of disconnection, which admits of no mixture,
and choose instead the path of connection, relationality, and similarity,
along which knowledge and experience are actually formed into the
actualizing of novelties that contain the new and the old, like and
unlike, infinite and finite, admiring this as Plato did when he said that
seeking the good requires a skilled wisdom like the art of mixing the
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water and the wine in the krater to make the most healthful drink. 11
We can overcome the dueling extremes of all-anthropocentrism and
null-anthropocentrism to which logic or habits of allegiance and fear
leads us.
And if perhaps mind-dependence is part of the interdependence of
all life—that is to say, truly “symbiotic” in the etymological sense of the
word as “living-together”—then there is an ontology for pilosophical
anthropology that understands the biosphere as a society and a philosophical understanding of the history of this society that preserves
humane values.
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